Despite the gaps in China’s environmental protection, by 2008 there was reason to feel more optimistic. The IPE database was having an impact, forcing some companies, especially those supplying MNCs, to improve their environmental performance. The OGI regulations offered the promise of increased government transparency and accountability.

But the overall state of China’s environment was grimmer than ever. A 2007 report from China’s environmental authorities and the World Bank concluded that 350,000-400,000 people died prematurely each year due to outdoor air pollution in China; the findings were redacted for the Chinese public. ^[24] In 2008, faith in the government’s ability to protect citizens was dealt two sharp blows. In May, an earthquake in Sichuan killed thousands of children when their shoddily constructed (and improperly inspected) schools collapsed. Later in the year, it was discovered that 22 domestic producers of milk and infant formula had been adulterating their products with melamine, a chemical mimicking the protein content of milk. Some 54,000 babies were hospitalized and six died of kidney damage.

After shutting down factories and limiting traffic in Beijing in an effort to clear the air for the 2008 Summer Olympics, heavy smog returned once the Games ended. Many factories had been moved outside the city, but pollution wafted back. Another development focused attention on air quality. Starting in April 2008, the US Embassy in Beijing tweeted hourly readings from an air quality monitor on its roof. The readings were a shock. They showed much higher levels of particulate matter than the Chinese government had previously conceded. Most of the “blue-sky days” in official records were deemed by the Americans to be well below WHO standards. The discrepancy arose because the Chinese government measured larger particulate matter (PM10) while the embassy measured smaller, more dangerous particulate matter (PM2.5) that could more easily lodge in the lungs and enter the blood stream.

The embassy readings, re-tweeted and re-posted on popular Chinese blogs, spread like wildfire. The Chinese government clearly felt unnerved: in July 2009, a Chinese Foreign Ministry official asked American diplomats to stop the Twitter feed, saying that the data “is not only confusing but also insulting” and could lead to “social consequences,”according to a State Department cable obtained by Wikileaks. ^[25] The embassy continued the feed.

The news got worse. In 2009, a series of heavy metal pollution incidents jarred the nation. Thousands of people, including many children, were found to have elevated blood levels of lead, nickel and cadmium. The 12 reported incidents of mass poisoning in five provinces were seen as the tip of the iceberg. Smelters, mines and battery manufacturers were among the suspected culprits. When provincial authorities ordered the closure of non-compliant operations, city and township officials quietly allowed them to continue operating after dark. Other factories that had regularly passed inspection were accused of discharging more heavily at night and between inspections. Fury over the mass poisonings sparked dozens of protests, some violent, as affected residents demanded violators be shut down for good.

People had begun to fear the most basic components of life—the water they drank, the air they breathed, the soil they farmed and the food they ate. As Ma Jun had predicted, information fuelled public action, which in turn jolted the central government. It tightened restrictions on heavy metal emissions and announced that the MEP was conducting a thorough study of heavy metal contamination across the country. ^[26]