Another source of tension was the agencies’ contradictory advice. As the days turned into weeks and then neared two months, everyone was trying to come up with an effective strategy. The second deadline of February 26 only sharpened their determination. The problem for the Monitor was that the CIA’s proposed strategy, which the CIA communicated to the Monitor through Bowers, was diametrically opposed to what the FBI recommended.

In mid-February, Bowers received a call from one of her CIA contacts. The agency was adamant that the Monitor turn up the publicity thermostat even more. Bowers transferred the call to Ingwerson. “They all but said, ‘If anything happens to her, it’s your fault because you’re not doing the right thing,’” Ingwerson says. At the same time, and confusingly, the CIA did not want the Monitor to “make noise” if that meant contact with other embassies or governments. CIA sources told Bowers unofficially that the Agency did not approve of such activities.

Nonetheless, Ingwerson and his staff continued to gather information and make inquiries of non-US governments. Washington Bureau Chief Cook, for example, met with officials at Israel’s embassy in Washington because they had extensive experience with kidnappings. They told him, “If you haven’t heard anything at this point, she’s gone.” Alas, that was not what Cook or his colleagues wanted to hear.

Watch Cook discuss how having no proof of life was tough

The FBI, on the other hand—as well as AKE, the security firm the paper retained immediately after Carroll’s abduction—wanted the Monitor to dampen its efforts. “The FBI didn’t want us to go loud, didn’t want us to put any information out, and didn’t want us to create political pressure,” Ingwerson says. ^[25] The Bureau argued that the measures already taken needed more time to work. They were encouraged by the successive videotapes, especially those which came after the lapsed deadline. They thought the tapes were a good sign: that Carroll’s captors had come to know her a little and were reluctant to kill her. With her fluent Arabic, she would be in a strong position to show them her human side.

Meanwhile, the Baghdad Boys analyzed previous kidnappings. They determined that fliers which friends and colleagues had posted in Iraqi neighborhoods seemed to help. If fliers were so effective, they reasoned, surely a short video clip on Iraqi TV would be even better. With the help of CNN’s Baghdad bureau, the two produced—but did not immediately air—two public service announcements (PSAs), one 60 ( translated transcript ) and the other, 90 seconds . One PSA opened with these words: “Please help with the release of journalist Jill Carroll.” A narrator, speaking in Arabic, spoke of Carroll’s love for Iraq. Photos of Carroll included one in which she wore a headscarf.

Watch Murphy discuss making the PSAs with CNN’s help

But Ingwerson had reservations about airing the PSAs, especially in light of recent events. In February, emotions ran high in the Islamic world after several newspapers reprinted 12 cartoons depicting the prophet Mohammed. ^[26] Muslims considered any physical renderings of the prophet blasphemous. In response, protests and threats of violence against Westerners erupted in Muslim nations and elsewhere around the globe. The Boston Globe reported that “gunmen in the West Bank reportedly combed hotels, possibly in search of Westerners to abduct.” ^[27]

On February 22, a revered Shiite Muslim shrine, al-Askari in Samarra, Iraq, was bombed, leaving its golden dome in ruins. Shiite militia then turned their machine guns on Sunni mosques. In one day, 27 Sunni mosques were destroyed. The New York Times reported that some Iraqi leaders “blamed the United States for failing to prevent [the attacks].” ^[28] Mob violence against US troops increased.

Watch Peterson discuss deciding when to run the PSAs

As the February 26 deadline approached, Team Jill stood at a crossroads once more. Carroll had been held captive for over six weeks. Stirring up publicity about Carroll again in Arab countries could backfire in such a hostile climate. More demonstrations by voluble groups could drive a wedge rather than “keep things open,” thought Ingwerson. Then there were the PSAs, which had yet to be broadcast. Several media colleagues reminded Ingwerson that mounting publicity on behalf of kidnapped aid worker Margaret Hassan in 2004 may have resulted in her death in Iraq. A former UK citizen married to an Iraqi and living in Iraq, Hassan was never found. “All the phony leads and stuff had all gone away,” Ingwerson says. “We were not hearing anything. We didn’t know where to go.”

Watch Peterson discuss not knowing how long he’d be in Baghdad

Watch Ingwerson discuss the times with no communications